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International monetary
matters that affect our lives
are explained by Mr. Edward B.
McEnerney, H&S editorial
consultant and an analyst of
international economic affairs.

It seems that most Americans have
been taking the international monetary system for granted. We've assumed that it will keep on working
well—and that in any case it can't have
much impact on our dollar.
But events of the past few months,
stemming chiefly from Britain's devaluation of the pound, suggest that
we had better take a second look at
these assumptions.
We realize now that monetary developments in faraway places could
ultimately strike at our entire economy. What happened last November
made this clear. When Britain devalued the pound sterling to solve her
monetary crisis, she also raised her interest rates to help suppress her rampant inflation. Our interest rates had to
follow suit, primarily to keep American
capital from rushing to London.
Result? Tougher borrowing in the
U.S., with all the attendant impact on
our domestic economy. And then came
President Johnson's d r a m a t i c New
Year's Day report that our 1967 balance
of payments deficit would exceed expectations and would require new controls over foreign investment, lending,
and travel.
All of these developments served to
focus attention on the entire worldwide
monetary system itself. In particular,
they threw the spotlight on the international role of the dollar, now the world's
chief reserve currency, and on the global effects of our balance of payments
deficits, dollar outflow, and gold drain.
Americans—businessmen and housewives, alike — suddenly realized they
had been ignoring these questions too
long. Many a conscientious citizen had
to admit how little he knew about monetary matters—the role of gold, the
function of reserve currencies, and so
on—but at least he now could see their
vital importance.
Fortunately, concern about the
world's monetary apparatus has been
shared for some time by statesmen and
monetary experts. This year will see the
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beginning of a new global debate on
what to do about it, and this open airing of many of the complex problems
involved will be a great help to the
average person in his attempts to understand them.
The debate will turn around a plan
now being prepared by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which President Johnson has said it is now "vital to
speed up." This plan seeks to help the
world absorb future monetary shocks
by the creation of what are known as
"Special Drawing Rights" (SDRs) for
member nations of the Fund. The
SDRs have been called "a new kind of
money" and hailed by some as a major
step forward in world monetary reform.
On March 31, the IMF, headquartered in Washington, is scheduled to
have completed work on the plan,
which was authorized in principle at
the 1967 annual meeting of the Fund,
held in Rio de Janeiro. When the completed plan receives the approval of the
IMF's Executive Roard, it will be submitted to each government for ratification. In order to take effect, it will have
to obtain the approval of enough of the
107 member nations so that the affirmative vote represents at least four-fifths
of the Fund's total voting power, which
is allocated among members in proportion to their assigned quotas in the
Fund.
The plan is a response to a premise
accepted by most experts in international monetary matters. This premise
holds that the present world monetary
system has served remarkably well
since the end of World War II, when it
was established, but that without substantial revision it cannot be expected
to serve effectively for many more
years. Some even fear worldwide monetary and economic chaos if changes are
not made fairly soon.
What are some of the grounds for
these fears? W h y has t h e system
seemed to work well so far? Why might
it stop doing so? What are some of the
conflicting interests and forces which
may affect the shape of any revisions
made? What are some of the implications this subject has for American
business planners ?

The Present System. Built around the
central core of the IMF, the present

gold exchange standard system is based
on gold and two "international reserve
currencies"—the dollar and the pound
sterling. The IMF provides a system for
multilateral surveillance and cooperation which was designed at the end of
the war to provide the monetary stability and liquidity necessary to put
world trade back on its feet.
The original IMF plan has been elaborated in the intervening years and has
succeeded in accomplishing its objectives during a period of unparalleled international economic expansion, primarily by providing access for IMF
members to a pool of gold and currencies established according to country
quotas. Each country pays into the
Fund one-fourth of its quota in gold
(and can draw foreign currencies equal
to its initial gold subscription) and
three-fourths in its own currency.
Since each nation is restricted by its
quota, the system can provide only a
limited flexibility and does not constitute a charter for economic and financial profligacy. Roughly speaking, it
acts as a fairly tight worldwide "credit
rating" system, a way in which the
assets and liabilities of a country —its
present worth and future potential —
can be measured, in a broad sense, on
a consistent basis.
If a country under special circumstances falls below what might be
called the general standards of "creditworthiness", it may well be given temporary credit by the Fund, since not to
do so might result in international financial dislocations. But these credits
are controlled, and it cannot simply rely
upon the international mechanism to
rescue it automatically. Its government
is expected to exercise internal monetary and fiscal discipline in the interests
of international monetary stability and
to restore equilibrium in its international financial position as soon as possible.
During the years since the end of the
war, the expansion of world trade has
been accompanied by a corresponding
expansion in the need for monetary reserves. In the years from 1951 to 1965
the total monetary reserves of governments grew by $20 billion, from $50
billion to $70 billion. During this period, however, the amount of newly
mined gold finding its way into mone-
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tary reserves, rather than to industrial
use or private hoarding, has never been
adequate to supply the worldwide demand for reserves. New gold supplied
only 40 per cent of the total increase in
monetary reserves during this period.
Despite this fact, the individual nations were able to acquire the reserves
they needed because of one basic circumstance: the balance of payments
deficits of the United States. It was because of the tremendous outpouring of
U.S. dollars resulting from U.S. deficits
that the other nations were able to meet
their reserve needs either by holding
their dollars or by converting them into
gold from the substantial U.S. gold
stock.
Many experts feel that, so long as
the U.S. balance of payments deficits
continue, there is no immediate need
for new measures to assure adequate
monetary reserves for other countries.
But it has long been clear—and President Johnson has now reaffirmed it—
that the United States cannot afford to
permit the persistent "gold drain" to
continue indefinitely. Apparently there
is fear in some places that if the imbalance were prolonged, the U.S. might
well find itself obliged to abandon its
now-historic policy of buying and selling gold at $35 an ounce, regarded by
many as the "centerpiece of stability"
in the international payments mechanism.
Some observers also think that, had
it not been for the Vietnam war, the
payments imbalance would probably
have long since been righted. The excess of our exports over our imports
(our "balance of trade") has been consistentiy favorable, so they feel that removal of expenditures for the war
would produce payments equilibrium
quickly. In fact, according to the Secretary of the Treasury, equilibrium could
result "within months," or within a year
at most, of the war's end.
To the extent that U.S. equilibrium
became a reality following a cessation
of hostilities, the lubricating agent
which has helped the system to function satisfactorily would have been diminished. To that extent, therefore,
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there would be a clearcut need for some
new way to supply the reserves needed
by other countries.
But the United States could not afford to await an end of the war as a
means of restoring equilibrium. Hence
the stern new control measures announced on New Year's Day. Yet some
observers feel these controls may still
need to be joined by other measures
the U.S. has so far avoided, such as tax
increases and cuts in government
spending.
The world will be anxiously watching Washington this year to see what
effect the new controls on overseas investment, lending and travel may have
and what other steps may be taken. To
the extent that the measures succeed in
restoring equilibrium, the need for new
reserves will become all the more apparent.
The Proposed New Plan. The proposed plan for SDRs—Special Drawing
Rights—thus responds to various threats
to the present system, including the
shortage of new gold and the potential
disappearance of the lubricating dollar
outflow and related gold drain.
It seeks to provide a new form of prearranged assistance whereby a nation
finding itself with a deficit—obliged to
pay out more abroad than it has taken
in—can obtain the currencies it needs
to make its payments.
It seems misleading to regard the
SDRs as a "new form of money," as
some have called them, since the SDRs
really would be nothing more then entries on a country's "special account"
with the IMF, as opposed to its "general account." The public would never
deal in SDRs.
The amount of SDRs credited on a
country's books would be in proportion
to the quota for its general account.
The United States, for example, which
at present has a quota of about 24 per
cent, might be issued something like
$250 million worth of SDRs each year
for an initial five-year period. A smaller
country would receive a correspondingly smaller amount.
Faced with a payments deficit, a
country would set in motion a kind of

bookkeeping transaction with another
country. Thus, Geimany might be requested to accept a certain amount of
Brazil's SDRs in return for some hard
currency needed by Brazil to carry out
its international transactions. If Germany agreed, a bookkeeping transfer
of SDRs would be made from Brazil's
account to Germany's and of the hard
currency from Germany's account to
Brazil's. Brazil would then be able to
meet her obligations in that currency
but would be obligated to redeem her
SDRs later.
For many hard-pressed countries
faced with chronic deficit problems,
the plan may well seem a panacea, a
way of "bailing them out" of their difficulties and permitting them to postpone the unpleasant internal measures
they would eventually have to take in
order to correct their imbalances.
This is precisely why the debate
which has arisen about SDRs focuses
not so much on their desirability as on
how to time their ultimate utilization.
The argument turns around the question of when they should actually be
brought into play and under what circumstances.
Basically two camps have formed
over this issue. One favors implementation of the drawing rights scheme at
the earliest possible time, under "liberal" conditions. The other favors postponement of actual implementation until the needs have become fully manifest and then only under the most stringent and carefully controlled conditions.
In a sense, this polarization reflects
the fact that, for all the changes the
world has seen in the last two hundred
years, the globe can still roughly be
divided into an "Old World"—basically
Europe—and the "New Worlds"—the
new, developing nations, with the
United States perhaps representing
"the oldest of the new."
Thus, the older nations, while they
favor the economic development of the
new nations, want to see that development as part of a disciplined, "programmed" evolution into the future,
checked and balanced in its pace and
structure by historic economic factors

and relationships. Broadly speaking,
France represents the leadership in this
group, and French thinking has a considerable effect on the thinking of her
partners in the European Common
Market on matters of monetary policy.
These European desires come to the
fore as the Europeans, led by France,
insist on a stronger voice in controlling
decisions over the release of SDRs.
Specifically, they want to increase the
percentage of voting power required
for decisions—from 80 per cent to 85
per cent. Thus their 17 per cent quota
would in effect give them a "veto power"
over decisions which might seem to
them to be too fast moving, perhaps
reckless. Under the present requirement of 80 per cent approval, only
the United States, with its 24 per cent
quota, enjoys such a "veto power."
This desire arises precisely because
of the "Old World" fear that the U. S.,
as the leader of the new nations, might
urge too speedy a course of action, one
which might satisfy the temporary
needs and desires of the new nations
but might lead to what the Europeans
would regard as "international fiscal
irresponsibility."
The Europeans have not confined
themselves, however, to implying that
the United States might favor policies
likely to encourage recklessness on the
part of others. They have remarked
that the persisting American payments
deficits suggest poor fiscal and monetary management on the part of the
U. S. itself. The implication is quite
clear: a country that cannot (for whatever reasons) maintain its own balance
cannot be expected to encourage others
to do so.
Tropical Agriculture and Capital Investment. This basic conflict of objectives between the United States and
Europe comes into sharp focus in connection with the needs and problems
of the crop-dominated tropical countries of the world, chiefly those of Latin
America and Africa.
It is these countries—the producers
of coffee, cocoa, bananas and other
products subject to sharp seasonal fluctuations—that feel most urgently the
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need for liberalized monetary drawing
rights.
When things go well for them, when
prices are up on the world market and
they have successful selling years, they
are likely to have little difficulty with
their payments.
But when things go badly, when
prices are down and their returns are
low, they feel sharply the need for currency reserves to keep up imports and
otherwise maintain their patterns of
payment.
If the French-led approach were to
prevail—implementation of the drawing rights plan on a very conservative,
tightly-controlled basis—most of these
countries would not find themselves
benefited sufficiently by the plan.
Irrespective of what decisions are
ultimately made over drawing rights,
the chief route to payments equilibrium for most developing countries
probably lies in capital investment for
domestic industrial production of goods
presently being imported. To the extent that new productive facilities cut
down the need for imports, a country's
payments position—all other things being equal—is bound to improve.
Where to get the capital for the new
flour mills, textile plants and brickyards
—at reasonable rates of interest—is one
of the most serious problems these
countries face.
If they can find it in the near future,
their monetary reserve problems could
become progressively less acute over a
span of years ahead. If they cannot,
their problems remain.
Here, then, is the reason why all of
the discussions over IMF drawing
rights sooner or later involve corollary
discussions over the future of the World
Bank's "soft-loan" affiliate, the International Development Association.
The IDA was created precisely to
provide long-term loans on easy terms
to foster projects which could enable
countries to strengthen their economies
and thus improve their international
payments positions.
Unfortunately, the IDA can move
only as fast and as far as the resources
it receives from the eighteen industrialized nations which contribute to it will
permit.
Anxious to accelerate the pace of
IDA operations, the United States has
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pressed its associates to increase their
contributions in the next few years—the
years in which capital investments designed to reduce imports would have to
be made if their effect is to be felt in
time to head off monetary crises for
many countries.
Response to the American initiatives
has been unenthusiastic, with most of
the eighteen co-sponsors more interested in encouraging the United States
to increase its contributions than in augmenting their own.
Thus the future of the IDA's budget
becomes an additional subject for discussion in tandem with that of the IMF
drawing-rights plan.
As the United States continues to
press the issue, it will undoubtedly be
seen that here again a divergence of
objectives between the "Old World"
and the "New World" must be recognized. Reduction of imports by many of
the developing countries in many cases
will mean a reduction of exports to
those countries by the European countries from which they have been buying. Does Europe look with favor on
this? Obviously the answer depends on
specific products and specific countries,
but it is not too difficult to see that it
will be unpalatable to many a European
manufacturer.
Whither Britain? As this confluence of
conflicting forces comes to bear on the
future of the international monetary
system, it becomes increasingly apparent that the most significant imponderable in the complex is the future of
Britain in the aftermath of devaluation.
Side by side with the debate over
monetary reserves and capital development runs the dialogue between
Britain and the European Common
Market countries over her proposed
membership. And this dialogue focuses
ever more sharply on the monetary conditions which the "Six," led by France,
might impose upon Britain as a condition of membership.
In its early phases, this dialogue
tended to deal with questions either of
a broad politico-strategic nature or of
a commercial character. Was Britain
prepared to "join Europe," as France
insisted, thus cutting her ties in a strategic sense with the Commonwealth
and the North American Colossus?
Could Britain be a good member of the

"European family?" Would Britain fight
for preferential treatment for Australian
agricultural products in the Common
Market area, for example, or would she
let them go by the board?
As the discussion progressed, however, it became more clear in the eyes
of some Common Market planners, particularly the French, that British membership would have to be accompanied
by sweeping changes in the international status of the pound sterling.
In the world monetary system set up
after World War II, sterling has clearly
taken second place to the dollar as an
international reserve currency. But this
does not mean to say that its worldwide
importance has disappeared. The key
components in world monetary reserves
remain gold, the dollar and sterling.
But if Britain joins the Common Market, what becomes of sterling? Does it
continue to play its role as an international reserve currency?
Depending upon the urgency with
which Britain views her need to join
the Six, the price may well be not only
an enforced restoration of Britain's balance of payments equilibrium but some
kind of transformation in sterling's present role as an international reserve currency.
Impact on American Business Decisions. American companies attempting to develop long-range programs will
find it essential to watch this worldwide debate over the international
monetary system, with all its multifaceted complexities, during the months
and years ahead. In one way or another
the decisions taken will sooner or later
affect the course of their affairs, whether
their focus is international or domestic.
For example, payments deficits and
domestic inflation may yet drive the
IT. S. to those classic techniques for
controlling inflation and deficits which
it has striven for many years to avoid
—higher taxes, reduced government
spending, still higher interest rates,
and even wage-price controls.
The ways in which these methods
might be used could easily spell danger
to the domestic economy even while
helping to dampen inflation and stem
the gold drain. They could lead to stagnation of the economy unless the control throttles were operated with the
utmost skill. Certainly the implications

for business planners would be momentous.
But the long-range consequence of
the new direct controls over investment
abroad could be equally alarming. After
all, the main impetus behind the rush of
American corporations into manufacturing operations abroad, particularly
in the Common Market area, has been
the danger they foresee to their sales
positions if they fail to get firmly established within the emerging tariff world
of the new Western Europe. Prolonged
maintenance of direct controls over
their investments would surely weaken
l o n g - r a n g e plans for c o m p e t i t i v e
growth.
From another point of view, planners concerned primarily with exports
from the U.S. to commodity-producing
countries subject to frequent payments
crises will be anxious to see the development of monetary reserves adequate
to support a continued rise in international trade.
It is quite clear, for all of these reasons and many others, that American
business planning is affected at numerous points by a host of problems relating in one way or another to the basic
issue of international monetary liquidity and stability.
Few observers, however, would attempt to predict just how much the
IMF's proposed SDRs would contribute to solving the international difficulties faced by U.S. business, even
though the President's desire to speed
up their preparations has brought them
new prominence.
But the present worldwide debate on
monetary reserves—in which the question of SDRs is but a central point
around which other issues turn—cannot fail to be salutary for business
planners to the extent that it brings
basic questions and opposing viewpoints into sharp focus.
American businessmen—and their accountants—will want to monitor the
progress of this debate as closely as
they can. The more they understand
this complex problem and see its potential effects on their own planning,
the more likely they are to make sound
projections and wise decisions. In so
doing, they may well contribute substantially to worldwide financial and
economic stability.
•
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